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ISSUES RAISED IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S REPONSE 
I. Whether the state need only promulgate rules with the force and effect of law 
when authorized by the legislature, and may do so as it pleases in all other 
instances. 
II. Whether one can be threatened by the state into consenting to a Fourth 
Amendment search. 
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A. Besa-w 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The state argues in its response that this Court should not overrule State v. Besmv, 155 
Idaho 134 (Ct.App.2013). The state also contends that nothing has changed since 2011 when the 
record in Besaw was created that should cause this Court to find that, in point of fact the IS P's 
SOPs cannot be reliable. 
The state, interestingly, recognizes that for the Court of Appeals to overrule Besaw, it 
must find it was manifestly wrong or that its holding over time has proven unwise or unjust. 
First, the Court of Appeals in Besaw overruled State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36 (Ct.App.1988), by 
changing the requirement for a method from "highly reliable" to "capable of providing an 
accurate result." The Court employed no test when it overruled its prior case. Second, 
circumstances have changed. The fifteen minute waiting period, one of the widest acknowledged 
requirements for accurate breath testing, stopped being a requirement in January, 2013. Standard 
Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing (January 16, 2013). If this Court needs proof that 
Besaw 's holding was unwise, it need only review the behavior of the ISP from 2008 to today. 
Lastly, the Cami's ruling was manifestly wrong. The Comi failed to recognize as it did when it 
decided Bell, that the method is only reliable where it is, in fact, a method. The Wheeler dissent 
did not rely on that to come to its holding any more than the majority rejected it when it arrived 
at its holding. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 148 Idaho 378,223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2010), 
review denied. Wheeler was a case involving statutory construction being applied to the SOPs. 
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Period. Nothing about the majority opinion held that a method could exist where there were no 
mandatory procedures. The Court of Appeals has never gone that far. The reason Besaw is so 
wrong is that it can see what the ISP had begun doing at the time that case was at the trial level, 
but rather than realize that under these circumstances there was no way to trust anything the ISP 
was promulgating, it approved of the agency's behavior. The defendant is not interested in 
walrus tears. See State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 88 (Ct.App.2007) quoting Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). Fundamental fairness and Due Process demand more. 
B. Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
The state begins its argument by claiming that agencies only need to promulgate rules 
where specifically authorized by statute. State's Brief at 34 quoting I.C. § 67-5231 (1 ). That is a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. Rather: 
The regulations that have the "force and effect of law" did not come through 
legislative enactment directly, but were adopted by administrators by authority of 
the legislature embodied in a statute. 
Mead v. Arnell, 1 17 Idaho 660, 668 ( 1990). The same misunderstanding of government power 
was posited by the executive in the Asarco matter: 
As a preliminary matter, contrary to DEQ's arguments, an agency action is not a 
rule because it was promulgated according to rulemaking authority and has the 
force and effect of law. Rather, an agency action characterized as a rule must be 
promulgated according to statutory directives for rulemaking in order to have the 
force and effect of law. See LC. § 67-5231 (declaring rules void unless adopted in 
substantial compliance with the requirements of the IAPA); Mead v. Arnell, 117 
Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency 
action have the force and effect of law). See also Minidoka Memorial Hospital v. 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 344, 699 P.2d 1358 (1985) 
(holding state policy, implemented as a rule without being promulgated as a rule, 
was unenforceable) and Bingham Memorial Hospital v. Idaho Department of 
Health and Welfare, 108 Idaho 346, 699 P.2d 1360 (1985) (same). Furthermore, 
even if DEQ has the discretion under the Clean Water Act to determine whether 
..., 
- .) -
or not the TMDL will have the force and effect of law in Idaho, under Idaho 
administrative law, the TMDL is still a rule and must be promulgated in 
accordance with the IAP A in order to be valid. 
Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). Thus, it is not that the executive can do 
whatever it wants except when authorized by statute, but that it has no power, whatsoever, to 
create rules that can have the force and effect of law except when granted that power by the 
legislature. Considering what an incredible misunderstanding of IDAP A this is, defense counsel 
is less surprised by the history of irresponsible and illegal acts on the part of the ISP. Evidently, 
the executive was under the impression that it could choose to make rules or not, except where 
explicitly told it was authorized to do so. See State's Brief at 35. 
The Attorney General would clearly benefit from a thorough reading of Mead. so as to 
remind itself that: 
A1iicle 2, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides for the separation of powers 
among the three branches ofldaho's government. Article 3, § 1 provides that the 
power to pass bills is vested in the legislature. Article 3, § 15 provides that, "[n]o 
law shall be passed except by bill, ... " Read together, these three constitutional 
provisions stand for the proposition that, of Idaho's three branches of government 
only the legislature has the power to make "law." See State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 
713,213 P. 358 (1923); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642,228 P. 796 (1924); 
Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 91 P.2d 362 (1939); Board of County Com'rs of 
Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae. Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 
(1975). 
While the power to make law lies exclusively within the province of the 
legislature, (Idaho Constitution, art. 3 § § 1, 15) "the legislature may 
constitutionally leave to administrative agencies the selection of the means and the 
time and place of the execution of the legislative purpose, and to that end may 
prescribe suitable rules and regulations." State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 664, 78 
P.2d 125, 128 (1938). Administrative agencies do this by enacting rules and 
regulations. See Idaho Code tit. 67, ch. 52. However, while these rules and 
regulations may be given the "force and effect of law," they do not rise to the level 
of statutory law. Only the legislature can make law. Idaho Power v. Blomquist, 26 
Idaho 222, 141 P. 1083 (1914); State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713,213 P. 358 (1923); 
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overruled on other grounds, Greater Boise Aud v. Royal Inn o/Boise, l 06 Idaho 
884, 684 P.2d 286 (1984); State v. Purcell, 39 Idaho 642, 228 P. 796 (1924); 
Marshall v. Department of Agric., 44 Idaho 440, 258 P. 171 (1927); Chambers v. 
J\!fcCollum, 47 Idaho 74,272 P. 707 (1928); State v. Heitz, 72 Idaho 107,238 P.2d 
439 (1951); Idaho Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Roden, 82 Idaho 128,350 P.2d 225 
(1960); Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876,499 P.2d 
575 (1972); Board a/County Com'rs o/Twin Falls County v. Idaho Health Fae. 
Auth., 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1975); and Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho 433, 
583 P.2d 360 (1978). 
Mead, 117 Idaho at 664. Once one recognizes that the executive has no power to make law, that 
ID APA must be followed if an agency wishes to create rules that affect the rights of others, and 
that the foundation for the admission of evidence at the defendant's criminal trial affects the 
defendant's right to Due Process, then it becomes clear that the ISP must follow IDAPA when 
promulgating the procedure that will be the sole foundation for evidence in a criminal trial. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent is not to the contrary. The Com1 held in Bell that 
the legislature had created a short form to introduce evidence by passing I.C. § 18-8004. The 
Com1 found in State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99 (Ct.App.1991) that l.R.E. 90 I (b )(10) allows the 
legislature to determine a condition whereby evidence is authenticated, in that case, the reliability 
of an Intoxilyzer 3000 breath testing machine. In both of those cases, the Court was reviewing 
the administrative rules promulgated by the Idaho Department Health and Welfare. In Stare v. 
Mills, 128 Idaho 426 (Ct.App.1996), the Court for the first and only time encountered the issue 
of whether "policy statements" could affect rights, but did not reach the issue because it was not 
preserved below. In State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 410-11 (Ct.App.1999), the Court rejected 
the argument that I.C. § 18-8004 violated the separation of powers and I.R.E. 1102. The Cou11 in 
Nickerson with little explanation held that I.C. § I 8-8004 "specifies one means by which the 
necessary foundation may be established ... " Id. at 41 I. That is of course not true, as the state so 
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points out. State's Brief at 35. The state does not believe that even ID APA can affect I.C. § 18-
8004. It is hard to understand how the Nickerson Court came to the conclusion that LC. § 18-
8004 was not the sole foundation that could be laid so long as the executive promulgated rules. 
It is also unclear what the Court was relying on for the principle that, simply because the Court 
had addressed procedures adopted by the Department of Health and Welfare ten year prior, there 
was no conflict with I.R.E. 1102 when a law purported to determine the proper foundation for 
evidence and waive the requirement for expert testimony. Moreover, the Court simply ignored 
the fact that the legislature had given those powers to the executive, and so essentially the wolf 
had been placed in charge of the hen house. 
None of these cases, however, actually held that I.C. § 18-8004( 4) allowed the executive 
to come up with whatever rules it pleased. In other states, the procedures for breath testing are 
set by statute. See. e.g., A.R.S. § 5-395.02; C.G.S.A. 14-227a; 10 G.C.A. § 69202. Even Idaho 
requires a fifteen minute wait period between breath samples for the Employer Alcohol and 
Drug-Free Workplace Act. See I.C. § 72-1704. The Idaho Court of Appeals has ruled, despite 
I.R.E. 1102, that the legislature may set the procedure in Idaho for the foundational procedure for 
the introduction of breath samples in criminal trials. The Court of Appeals has tacitly allowed 
that task to be delegated to the executive. But the Court has never held that I.C. § 18-8004( 4) 
was a blank check to admit evidence in criminal cases. It has never held that the ISP did not 
have to comply with ID APA before creating rules that would have the force and effect of law. 
And this Court must not do so now. 
To do otherwise would undo our legal system. There is nothing about DUI cases so 
unique that the concept that the legislature may simply give the executive carte blanche to 
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determine what foundation is required for evidence will not spread to every type of case 
imaginable. If this Court does not believe it surrendered power to the legislature in Nickerson, it 
should review with a critical eye the legislature's wholesale provision of this branch's power to 
the executive. Unless we are to be ruled by tyrants, the flow of powers from the judiciary to the 
executive must stop. 
The state also argues for several pages that if the SOPs are rules then the defendant 
cannot challenge them. That is true, in a sense. But by "challenge," that does not mean that they 
cannot be "challenged" as to their validity for being the foundation of evidence in this case. 
Rather, the Court of Appeal's oft repeated holding that the defense can always rebut the 
presumption that the procedures adopted by the executive are adequate would be untrue in the 
context of a criminal case. Rather, challenging the procedures' accuracy would necessarily have 
to be done through the channels etched out by IDAP A. See Kay Manweiler, Somewhere Over the 
Rainbow and Through the Looking Glass: Administrative Law Practice and Procedure, Advocate 
(Feb. 2002). The state's profound misunderstanding ofIDAPA is likely what leads to its 
confusion expressed in footnote seven on the thirty-ninth page of its brief. The Asarco, inc. v. 
State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) ruling is not confusing when one realizes that if an agency has a 
"policy" that it is treating, and forcing others to treat, as a rule with the force and effect of law, 
then it is well within the rights of any citizen and this Court to point out to said agency that its 
"policy" has no such power, and is, in point of fact, null and void. 
The state ends with an illogical argument that the SOPs are simply internal guidelines 
"that, if followed by law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal 
proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to J.C. § 18-8004( 4)." State's brief at 
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43. Assuming the state did not mean this to be ironic, the defense would point this Court to State 
v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 417 (2013). It is hardly a fair trial or tribunal where the accuser is also 
the judge detennining whether the evidence comes in. 
IL 
In its response, the state argues that state governments may threaten away federal rights 
with "civil penalties" in the context of blood and breath searches for evidence of alcohol or 
substances because, though a warrant is required, something less than "actual consent" is 
sufficient to overcome that requirement. The state, which below had argued Missouri v. 
1\1cNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013) had no effect on consent, now seems to have accepted 
that perhaps consent is revocable. The state further argues that the "consent" a McNeely warrant 
requires for an exception is not "actual consent." State's Response at 27, quoting Stale v. 
LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 911-12 (Ct.App.2010). In essence, the state is arguing that what 
1\1cNeely created for those accused of DUI and confronted by the state's wish to search their 
breath or blood is a quasi-Fourth Amendment right. If one were to view Fourth Amendment 
protections on a spectrum, with border searches on one end and homes on the other, breath and 
blood would evidently fall just after automobiles and just before boxes (not in an automobile or 
near/on a person during arrest). Cf United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 
376 (1971) and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230 
(2008); and compare United States v. Chadwick, 433 US l ( 1977) with Chime/ v. California, 395 US 
752 (1969) and United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218 (1973) andCal(fornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1991)). Of course, the United States Supreme Court has never before recognized a quasi-
warrant requirement where a warrant is required, but the government may force consent. Either a 
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wanant was required or it was not. 
The state provides as authority for its argument cases which, as the defendant already 
demonstrated, confuse the original understanding of implied consent from State v. Woolery, 116 
Idaho 368 (1989), in which implied consent was not "actual consent" as it was not related to the 
Fourth Amendment, and the improper understanding of State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406 
(Ct.App.1999), where implied consent suddenly began to affect Fourth Amendment rights. If 
this Court will return to the proper understanding of implied consent, then the state's argument 
while correct in the sense of what implied consent means, cannot withstand scrutiny when 
applied to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Once a warrant has issued the 
state's argument would be correct. But prior to a warrant, no state law may force from a citizen 
his right to be free from wmTantless search and seizure. 
DATED this d 3 day of October, 2014. 
BY: 
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OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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